Plant closings: comparative and American perspectives by Aaron, Benjamin
BENJAMIN AARON* 
Plant Closings: Comparative and American Perspectives** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this article would probably have been considered somewhat 
recondite and not very interesting prior to the mid-1970s; it is, unhappily, 
a sign of our current economic plight that the problem of plant closings, in-
cluding partial shutdowns and relocations, is now high on the list of national 
concerns. For example, according to a survey by the Bureau of National 
Affairs, during the first three months of 1982, 350,000 U. S. workers lost 
their jobs either permanently or temporarily, and there were 112 permanent 
shutdowns.1 The topic embraces economic dislocation as it affects workers, 
the local economy, local and federal government, and the community2 The 
article will discuss laws and public policies relevant to this topic. Seme atten-
tion also will be given to the ways in which other countries attempt to deal 
with it. 
It should be emphasized at the outset that in the United States union 
members comprise less than 25 percent of the workforce,3 and the number 
of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements is only slightly in 
excess of 25 percent.4 Thus, even though the organized portion of the labor 
force is heavily concentrated in the so-called smokestack industries, where 
most dislocations have occured, it remains true that the problem of plant 
closings, broadly defined, is not one that can be dealt with effectively within 
the framework of legislation applicable only to collective-bargaining rela-
tionships. 
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1 BNA EDITORIAL STAFF, LABOR RELATIONS IN AN ECONOMIC RECES-
SION: JOB LOSSES AND CONCESSION BARGAINING 3 (1982). A study by the 
investment firm of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., estimated that 
at least 80,000 steel mill jobs have vanished since 1979. Most are in the "Rust 
Bowl" region that includes parts of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, 
Indiana, and Illionis. "Rust Bowl: Steel Mills Waste Away," Los Angeles Times, 
April 25, 1983, pp. 1, 8. 
2 See Millspaugh, The Campaign for Plant Closing Laws in the United States: 
an Assessment, 5 CORPORATION L. REV. 291, n. 1 (1982). 
s DIRECTORY OF U. S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, 1982—83 EDITION 44 (C. 
Gifford ed. 1982). 
4 Id. at 46. 
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II. PRESENT LEGISLATION 
A) Federal Legislation5 
1. Regulated Industries 
a) Railroads. 
It is not commonly recognized that in the regulated, or formerly regu-
lated, industries—railroads, trucking, airlines, and urban mass transportation— 
employees have received considerable protection from the consequences of 
layoffs or displacement resulting from mergers, acquisitions, and abandon-
ments.6 
In the railroad industry, since the initial federal intervention in the form 
of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933,7 a combination of 
statutory, administrative, and collective bargaining protective provisions has 
substantially eased the impact on employees of mergers, acquisitions, and 
abandonments, including job losses resulting from technological changes and 
corporate reorganizations. Significantly, the most important initial protection 
was provided, not by legislation, but by a collective bargaining agrement 
between 20 major railroad unions and 85 percent of the railroad carriers 
known as the Washington Job Protection Agreement. This agreement, which 
applied only to mergers and abandonments, provided, among other things, 
for payment of 60 percent of a displaced worker's pay for up to five years, 
depending on his length of service; displacement allowances for five years for 
employees retained at lower pay; relocation moving expenses; and severance 
pay based on length of service. Collective bargaining agreements incorporating 
the provisions of the Wasington Job Protection Agreement were enforceable 
through the machinery of the Railway Labor Act.8 
During the period 1936 to 1940, in the absence of any federal legislation, 
the Interstate Commerce Comission (ICC), exercising its statutory discretionary 
power to impose conditions required to render merger proposals „consistent 
with the public interest", included labor protective privisions in orders appro-
ving railroad mergers.9 In 1940 the Interstate Commerce Act was amended 
to provide mandatory statutory protection for employees within its jurisdic-
tion. The ICC was directed, in approving railroad mergers, to "require a fair 
and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees 
affected," and to include in its order provisions designed to insure for a four-
year term that affected employees would not be placed in a worse position 
in respect of their employment. The Supreme Court subsequently held that 
5 Additional federal laws not dealt with in this article include those providing 
assistance to employees adversely affected by foreign competition, e.g., Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, PUB. L. No. 87—794, 76 Stat. 872; United States Trade Act 
of 1974, 19 U. S. C. §§ 2251-2394 (1978). See MacNeil, Plant Closings and Workers' 
Rights, 14 OTTOWA L. REV. 1, 46-48 (1982). 
« Blumberg, Collective Layoffs: Protection of Employees Against Dismissal or 
Displacement as a Result of Mergers, Closings, or Work Transfers, 26 A. J. COMP. 
L. 277-78 (Supp. 1978). Discussion is here confined to railroads and airlines and is 
based almost entirely on Dean Blumberg's excellent summary. For his treatment 
of motor carriers, water carriers and freight forwarders, other regulated utilities, 
urban mass transportation, and pollution control acts, see id. at 281, 282-83. 
7 48 Stat. 211 (1933). 
8 45 U. S. C. § 3 (1972). 
8 49 U. S. C. § 5(2)(b)(Supp. 1977). 
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the statute did not impose a mandatory "job freeze."10 In his dissenting opi-
nion, Justice Douglas noted that the House had adopted a proviso prohibiting 
the Commission from approving a merger if it would result in unemployment 
or displacement of employees or in the impairment of their existing employ-
ment rights.11 This proviso, which had been rejected by the Congress, repre-
sented one of the first of many unsuccessful legislative attempts to curb 
management decisions to terminate employees for bona fide economic rea-
sons.11/a 
The final sentence of section 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act reads: 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, an agreement pertaining 
to the protection of the interests of said employees may hereafter be entered 
into by any [railroad] carrier or carriers . . . and the duly authorized repre-
sentative or representatives of its or their employees." Nevertheless, in a divi-
ded decision, the Supreme Court held that a collective agreement reducing the 
benefits provided in a prior agreement that met the requirements of section 
5(2)(f) was not enforceable.12 
The Interstate Commerce Act also requires approval by the ICC of any 
route or station abandonment. The statutory standard in the case of abandon-
ments involves the "public convenience and necessity." The Supreme Court 
unanimously held that this standard requires the ICC to consider the impact 
of abandonments on labor,13 and rejected the Commission's view to the 
contrary as "not only hostile to the major objective of the Act and inconsis-
tent with decisions of this Court, but irreconcilable with its own interpreta-
tions of § 5(4)."14 Thereafter, commencing in 1944,15 the ICC has required 
severance pay in route and station abandonment cases generally. Except in 
cases of total abandonment by carriers in extreme financial difficulty, the 
so-called Burlington formula (100 percent of compensation for four years or 
the employee's length of service, if less) has been uniformly applied.16 
The Supreme Court, in a narrowly divided decision, held in 1960 that the 
Railway Labor Act required the carrier to bargain over its decision to 
eliminate railroad stations and station jobs,17 thereby strengthening, as one 
writer put it, the "symbiotic relation between the statutory scheme and 
collective bargaining in the railroad industry."18 
The provisions of the Washington Job Protection Agreement were im-
proved upon by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, which required "fair 
and equitable arrangements" to protect the interests of employees affected by 
the discontinuance of intercity rail passenger service.19 The arrangements were 
10 Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 336 U. S. 
169, 177-79 (1961). 
11 Id. at 192. 
li/a 47 U.S.C & 5 (2) (f) (1976). 
is Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S. 37 (1971). 
is ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U. S. 373 (1942). 
14 Id. at 380. • ' 
is Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Abandonment, 257 I. C. C. 700 (1944). 
16 See Brown, Employee> Protection and the Regulation of Public Utilities, 
Mergers, Consolidations and Abandonment of Facilities in the Transportation In-
dustry, 63 YALE L. J. 445, 452-53 (1954), cited in Blumberg, supra note 6, at 280 n. 17. 
17 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 362 U. S. 330 (1960). 
See Meltzer, The Chicago Sc North Western Case: Judicial Workmanship and Col-
lective Bargaining, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 113. 
is Blumberg, supra note 6, at 280. 
19 45 U. S. C. §§ 541, 565 (1972). 
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to be approved by the Secretary of Labor. The protective provisions certified 
by the Secretary for displaced or dismissed employees increased the dismissal 
allowance to 100 percent of compensation and extended the period of com-
pensation from five to six years; moreover, the period commenced on the 
later date of actual displacement, rather than on the earlier date of the 
discontinuance.20 
Finally, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 197321 and the Rail Revi-
talization Reform Act of 197622 provided similar job protective provisions for 
railroad employees on a regional and national basis, respectively. 
b) Airlines _ 
Although the Federal Aviation Act, providing for regulation of commer-
cial air carriers, contains no provisions for the protection of employees, sec-
tion 1378(b) requires that all airline mergers, purchases, leases, control acqui-
sitions, and route changes be approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 
which must find that the transaction is "consistent with the public interest."28 
The CAB has followed the pattern of protective labor provisions developed 
for the railroads by the ICC. Its own pattern was established in the United-
Capital Merger Case,2* in 1961; it consisted of 13 conditions, including, seve-
rance pay (60 percent for a period of five years, depending upon length of 
service), displacement allowances, and integration of seniority lists for the 
protection of affected employees. 
The CAB has been criticized for "blindly" following the ICC,25 on the 
theory that the "declining railroads" were hardy an appropriate model for 
the "vigorously expanding airline indulstry" ;26 but, of course, all that has 
changed in recent years, and the airlines, too, face declining revenues, 
mounting deficits, and in some cases, bankruptcy. Mergers are on the increase, 
and the need for protective provisions for affected airline employees is greater 
than ever. 
In the foregoing brief review of employee protection in the railroad and 
airline industries, two facts stand out. The first is that the prime impetus 
to the development of those protective patterns was not a statute, but a pri-
vate collective-bargaining agreement—the Washington Job Protection Agree-
ment of 1936. The second, and more important, is that all of the protective 
provisions, whether fixed by statute or by private agreement, deal with the 
consequences of the mergers, acquisitions, and abandonments; none offers 
any opportunity for the employees concerned, or their bargaining representa-
tives, to participate with management in making the initial decisions. The 
reasons for this significant distinction are articulated more cleary in cases 
20 PUB. L. No. 91-518, App. C-l , C-2, C-3, 83 Stat. 1327 (1970). See Congress 
of Railway. Unions v. Hodgson, 326 F. Supp. 68, 76 (D. D. C. 1971). 
21 45 U. S. C. §§ 701, 771-79 (Supp. 1977). 
22 45 U. S. C. §§ 801, 836 (Supp. 1977), 
23 49 U. S. C. §§ 1301, 1378(b)(1970). All functions, powers, and duties of the 
CAB were terminated or transferred by the Act of Oct, 24, 1978, PUB. L. No. 
95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744 (1978), effective on or before Jan. 1, 1985. All 
functions, powers, and duties under § 1378 were transferred to the Department of 
Justice. 
24 33 C. A. B. 307, 323-31, 342 (1961). 
25 See Rosenfield, Airline Mergers: The Public Interest in Labor Protective 
Provisions, 61 KY. L. REV. 429, 450-51, 459 (1973), cited in Blumberg, supra note 
6, at 282, n. 32. 
26 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 282. 
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decided under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),37 which are, 
discussed in the following section. 
2. Unregulated Industries 
a) Collective Bargaining 
The Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to 
bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative of its employ-
ees.28 It also defines collective bargaining as the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the parties to meet and confer in good faith over wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, but does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a 
concession.29 
IVJiost of the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and 
the courts bearing on complete or partial plant closings or relocations, or the 
contracting out of work formerly performed by plant employees, have con-
centrated on the question whether the employer's conduct constituted a refusal 
to bargain. The broad outlines of the doctrine developed by those decisions 
are now fairly well established.30 Thus, "an employer has the absolute right 
to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases," but this right does 
not include the ability to close part of a business no matter what the rea-
son."31 Although total liquidation is not an unfair labor practice, even if it is 
"motivated by vindictiveness toward the union,"32 the legal consequences of 
thereafter continuing in business may be different. For example, in Textile 
Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co. the Supreme Court ruled in part: 
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed for 
antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another business, whether or not 
affiliated with or engaged in the same line of commercial activity as the 
closed plant, of sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping a 
benefit from the discouragement of unionization of the business; (2) act 
to close their plant with the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) 
occupy a relationship to the other business which makes it realistically 
foreseeable that its employees will fear that . such business will also be 
dlosed down if they persist in organizational activities . . . an unfair labor 
practice has been made out.33 
An employer faced with the economic necessity of either moving or con-
solidating the operations of a failing business has no duty, in the absence of 
any showing of antiunion animus, to bargain with the union concerning the 
decision to shut down part of the operation; but it does have a duty to notify 
« 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-168 (1976). 
28 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a)(1976). 
29 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(d) (1976). 
so Outside the scope of this article is the phenomenon of the "runaway shop," 
an actual removal of a plant to a different location to forestall, or to retaliate 
against, the exercise by employees of their rights to organize and to bargain col-
lectively, as guaranteed by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1976). Such con-
duct may be a violation not only of § 8(a)(5), but also of § 8(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 158(a)(1)(1976) (interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise of 
rights guaranteed by § 7), and § 8(a)(3), 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) (discrimination 
in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, 
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization). 
3i Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U. S. 263, 268 (1965). 
»2 Id. at 274. 
S3 Id. at 275-76. 
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the unión of its intentions in order to give the latter a chance to bargain 
over the effects of the partial closing on the employees involved.34 How much 
notice is required is not clear.35 
As a general rule, the decision whether to contract out work being per-
formed by employees in a bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. Yet the holding to that effect in the leading case of Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corp. v. NLRB36 has been somewhat circumscribed by Justice 
Stewart's concurring opinion, which has been relied upon as authority almost 
equal to that of the opinion- of the Court. Troubled by what he considered 
the "implications of . . . disturubing breadth" radiating from the Court's 
opinion in Fibreboard, Justice Stewart sought to limit its scope in part as 
follows: 
. . . [T]here are . . . areas where decisions by management may quité 
clearly imperil job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely. 
An enterprise may decide to invest in labor-saving machinery. Another 
may resolve to liquidate its assets and go out of business. Nothing the 
Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain 
collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of 
entrepreneurial control. Décisions concerning the commitment of invest-
ment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves 
primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the deci-
sion may be necessarily to terminate employment.37 
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on this general subject 
came in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,38 in which an employer 
terminated a contract with a customer and discharged the employees who had 
been working under that contract. A majority of the Court, speaking through 
Justice Blackmun, held that although the employer had a duty to bargain in 
good faith with the union representing its employees over the effects of the 
decision, it had no duty to bargain over the decision itself. Justice Blackmun 
proposed a; bálancing test that would not, in his words, "serve either party's 
individual interest, but . . . [would] foster in a neutral manner a system in 
which the conflict between these interests may be resolved" ;39 but it must be 
conceded that he put his thumb on the scales. He apparently took for granted 
"the employer's need for unencumbered decision-making,"40 and starting with 
that premise, he had no trouble reaching the conclusion that "bargaining over 
management decisions that have a substantial impact on . . . continued . . . 
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management re-
lations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on 
the conduct of the business."41 Here, again, Justice Blackmun's assumptions 
favored the employer. Conceding the union's "legitimate concern over job 
security," he declared that its practical purpose in participating in a decision 
84 NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F. 2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). 
85 In Firet Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U. S. 661, 682 (1981), the Court 
said that bargaining over the effects of a decision "must be conducted in a 
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time and the Board may impose sanctions 
to insure its adequacy." 
88 379 U. S. 203 (1964). 
37 Id. at 223. 
38 452 U. S. 661 (1981). 
39 Id. at 680-81. 
40 Id. at 679. 
41 Ibid. 
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whether to close a particular facility would be "largely uniform: it will seek 
to delay or halt the closing."42 And although the union would doubtless "be 
impelled, in seeking these ends, to offer concessions, information, and alter-
natives that might be helpful to management of forestall or prevent the ter-
mination of jobs," he thought it unlikey that requiring bargaining over the 
decision itself, as well as its effects, would "augment this flow of information 
and suggestions."43 
Justice Blackmun recognized that if labor costs are an important factor 
in the decision to close, management has an incentive voluntarily to discuss 
the matter with the union and to seek concessions that will permit it to con-
tinue operations. On the other hand, he observed that 
management may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in 
meeting business opportunities and exigencies. It may face significant tax 
or securities consequences that hinge on confidentiality, the timing of 
plant closing, or a reorganization of the corporate structure. The publicity 
incident to the normal process of bargaining may injure the possibility 
of a successful transition or increase the economic damage to the business. 
The employer may also have no feasible alternative to the closing, and 
even goodfaith bargaining over it may be both futile and cause the 
employer additional loss.44 
Finally, Justice Blackmun concluded that the harm likely to be done to 
an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down 
part of. its business piurely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental 
benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in making 
the decision, and we hold that the decision itself is not part of . . . terms 
and conditions" . . . over which Congress has mandated bargaining.45 
In deciding First National Maintenance the Court "intimate [d] no view 
as to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, 
subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular 
facts."46 The NLRB General Counsel subsequently addressed himself to those 
types of decisions in a memorandum applying the balancing test47 enunciated 
by the Court.48 In this regard, he stated, the focus should be on whether the 
employer's decision was based on labor costs or other factors that would be 
amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining process. In respect of 
managerial decisions similar to that involved in First National Maintenance, 
the General Counsel thought that the decision in that case covered econocally-
motivated decisions to go wholly out of business, to terminate a distinct line 
of business, and to sell a ¡business to another and nó longer to remain in it. 
Regarding the latter two situations, the NLRB had come to the same conclu-
sion prior to the Court's decision in First National Maintenance.49 
« id. at 681. 
43 ibid. 
44 id at. 682-83. 
4s id. at 686 (italics in original). : 
46 Id. at 686, n. 22. 
47 See text at note 38 supra. 
48 General Counsel Memorandum No. 81-57, Nov. 30, 1981, 4 CCH LAB L. 
REP 9271. 
49 See, e.g., Kingwood Mining Co., 210 N. L. R. B. 844 (1974), aff'd sub nom. 
UMW v. NLRB, 515 - F. 2d 1018 (D. C. Cir. 1975) (employer ceased coal mining 
operations while continuing to operate its coal tipple); General Motors Corp. 191 
N. L. R. B. 951 (1971), af fd , 470 F. 2d 422 (D. C. Cir. 1972) (sale of retail outlet 
to franchise dealer). 
Of course, the employer is obligated to bargain over the effects of these 
transactions on his employees; but unlike the situation in the regulated in-
dustries, the law imposes no minimum protections that must be accorded to 
those employees. 
B) State Legislation 
Three States, Maine, Wisconsin, and Sooth Carolina have enacted laws 
dealing with plant closings. The Maine statute50 provides that any employer 
proposing to relocate a covered establishment outside the State shall notify 
employees and the officers of the municipality where the plant is located at 
least 60 days prior to the relocation. Violations are punishable by a maximum 
fine of #500, which may not be imposed if the relocation "is necessitated by a 
physical calamity, or if the failure to give notice is due to unforeseen circum-
stances." In addition, any employer who relocates or terminates a covered 
establishment will be liable to his employees for severance pay at the rate of 
one week's pay for each year of employment by the employee in that 
establishment. Again, this provision does not apply if relocation or termination 
of an establishment is "necessitated by a physical calamity." 
The Wisconsin statute51 provides that every employer employing 100 or 
more persons in the State who has decided upon a merger, liquidation, dispo-
sition or relocation within or without the State shall notify the Department 
of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations at least 60 days prior to taking 
such action. The employer is obligated to provide in writing all information 
concerning its payroll, affected employees, and the wages and other remuner-
ation owed to such employees that the Department may require. The penalty 
for failure or refusal to provide such information is a maximum fine of $50 
for each terminated employee. 
The South Carolina Statute518 applies only to employers "requiring" notice 
from any employee of the time such employee will quit work." Such an 
employer must notify its employees of its "purpose to quit work or shutdown" 
by posting notices to that effect "not less than two weeks in advance or the 
same length of time in advance as is required by it of its employees before 
they may quit work ."The notices must state the date of the beginning of the 
shutdown or cessation from work and the approximate length of time it will 
continue. These provisions do not apply to shutdowns or temporary cessation 
of work causued by accidents to machinery or by some act of God or of the 
public enemy. Violations of the law are subject to a fine not exceeding 
#5.000; in addition, the employer will be liable "to each and every one of his 
employees for such damages as such employee may suffer by reason of such 
failure to give such notice." 
As can readily be seen, the fines imposed by the Maine and Wisconsin 
statutes are purely nominal and withouth any deterrent effect; but the notice 
requirements provide the opportunity for state authorities and unions, if any 
are involved, to put pressure on employers to discuss their plans and, possibly, 
to modify or even abandon them. The fines provided for in the South Carolina 
so ME. REV.- STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625B (1982-83 Supp.). 
51 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109. 07. 
«/a S. C. Code S. C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40. 
statute are somewhat larger, though hardly severe. In any case, employers 
may take themselves out of the reach of the statute simply by not requiring 
their employees to give notice of their intention to quit. 
It is thus clear that the statutory protection of employees against collec-
tive layoffs due to plant closures or removals is both uneven and very limited. 
To the extent that the problem is dealt with in collective bargaining agree-
ments, provisions are made for severance pay, relocation payments, and 
preference in job selection at the new localities. Some agreements provide for 
minimal job retraining and assistance in finding jobs with other employers. 
The number of employees covered by such provisions, however, in relation to 
the number of those displaced, is miniscule. Efforts by unions to obtain 
broader protection of employment security in their collective bargaining 
agreements have not been very productive. 
III. COMMON-LAW RULES 
At least as far back as the sit-down strikes of the 1930s, workers claimed 
some sort of "property rights" in their jobs, but those assertions were not 
based upon any carefully developed and articulated theory. That task was 
undertaken by Professor Frederic Meyers in his seminal work, Ownership of 
Jobs: A Comparative Study,52 which has prompted others to explore this 
question. Space does not permit a summary of Meyers' views;53 but for pre-
sent purposes it is sufficient to quote one paragraph from his study: 
A job, of course, is an abstraction, but like other abstractions such 
as "good will" and "expectancy of profit," it may become the object of 
"ownership." Acceptance of the idea of job ownership then raises the 
issue of the consequences of involuntary deprivation of "title."54 
Whatever the merits of this notion may be, suits alleging that this "in-
voluntary deprivation of 'title'" as a result of plant closings or removals 
violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against deprivation 
of property without due process of law have uniformly been rejected by the 
courts. A decision that some scholars thought might signal an important new 
trend in judicial thinking was handed down by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in 1961, in the case of Zdanok v. Glidden,55 which held that 
employees at a plant that had been moved to another city were entitled to 
employment at the new plant site with full seniority rights accumulated under 
the collective agreement at the former site. Characterizing seniority rights as 
"unemployment insurance," the court majority concluded that the employees 
involved had " 'earned' their valuable unemployment insurance, and that their 
rights in it were 'vested' and could not be unilaterally annulled,"56 notwith-
standing that the collective agreement creating the seniority had expired. 
32 F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF JOBS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1964). 
53 See Aaron, The Ownership of Jobs: Observations on the American Expe-
rience, in JOB EQUITY AND OTHER STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
50 (W. Fogel ed. 1982). 
54 MEYERS, supra note 52, at 3. 
55 288 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on another issue, 370 U. S. 530 (1962). 
so Id. at 103. 
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The decision in Glidden was criticized57 and defended,58 but its reasoning was 
rejected by other courts,59 and the coup de grace was delivered by the Second 
Circuit itself in Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,60 six years 
later. 
In recent years a considerable body of literature has been devoted to 
attacking the American doctrine of employment at will, which holds that in 
the absence of some express agreement or statutory provision to the contrary, 
the employment relation is "at will," and may be severed by either party, 
at any time, for any reason or no reason.01 A number of recent court decisions 
have refused to follow the rule,62 but these cases have all involved individual 
discharges, not collective layoffs or dismissals in connection with plant closures 
or removals. 
Accordingly, those wishing to provide greater job protection for employees 
in cases of plant closures and removals have shifted their emphasis to pro-
posals for additional statutory regulation. Before discussing those legislative 
proposals, however, I shall review briefly some relevant experiences in a few 
other countries. 
IV.. EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE63 
A. Sweden 
Limitations of space compel me to confine my discussion of foreign 
experience to selected European countries and the European Economic Com-
munity. 
Sweden, as usual, seems to have the most advanced, comprehensive, hu-
mane, and successful policies dealing with potential and actual employee dis-
locations resulting from plant closures or removals, or reductions in employ-
ment levels. As is the case in so many aspects of formulating and admini-
stering social and economic programs in Sweden, a key role in dealing with 
problems of employment dislocation is played by a tripartite body of 
government, business, and labor union representatives, known as the National 
57 E.g., Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority 
Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962). 
58 E.g., Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change, 47 MINN. L. REV. 
505 (1963).; Note, Treatment of Monetary Fringe Benefits and Post Termination 
Survival of the Right to Job Security, 72 YALE L. J. 162, 168-81 (1962). 
59 E.g., Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F. 2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 
371 U. S. 941 (1962). 
eo 405 F. 2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1968): "It is time that Glidden be formally interred. 
It is therefore expressly overruled." 
• 6i See, e.g., authorities cited in Aaron, supra note 53, at 85-86. 
62 See, e.g., Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Roulette—Dis-
charging Employees, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 380 (1982), and cases cited therein. 
63 Much of the material in this section is drawn from ECONOMIC DISCOLA-
TION: PLANT CLOSINGS, PLANT RELOCATIONS AND PLANT CONVERSION 
(1979). Subtitled "Policies and Programs in Three Countries [Sweden, West Ger-
many, and Great Britain]; Recommendations for the United States," this work is a 
joint report submitted by a group of Labor Union Study Tour Participants from 
the United Auto Workers, United Steel Workers, and the International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. It will be cited hereafter as "JOINT 
REPORT." 
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Labor Market Board—AMS for short. Of the 13 voting members, six are 
selected from blue-collar, white-collar, and professional employee federations; 
three from the employers' federation, two from government, and one each 
representing women and agriculture. Despite the unions' voting majority, 
most decisions of the AMS have been unanimous.64 
AMS is supported at the national level by a staff of 800; its 24 county 
labor market boards and over 200 local employment services offices through-
hout the county employ about 8,000 civil service employees. Its annual 
budget is about $2 billion—roughly nine percent of Sweden's total national 
budget and 2.5 percent of GNP. These funds are used to administer a wide 
range of programs, including the employment service, labor mobility assist-
ance, training, and vocational guidance and rehabilitation. In addition, there 
are employment subsidy programs and inventory stockpiling programs to keep 
people in their jobs,'as well as a variety of innovative job-creation programs.65 
The AMS is aided in coping with economic dislocation by the legal 
requirement that employers give advance notice of impending dismissals. 
Before implementing decisions to close a plant or permanently to reduce the 
level of employment at a facility, employers must give notice to the union, 
the appropriate county branch of the labor market board, and the employees 
involved. The union must be notified as soon as management has reached a 
tentative decision to reduce the level of employment at a facility. Under the 
1976 Act on Co-determination at Work,66 management may not implement 
its decision until it has negotiated with the union, which has full legal rights 
of access to company financial arid other information. The employer is obli-
gated to negotiate* every aspect of its decision with the union, including the 
number of jobs to be eliminated, the timing of .any proposed reductions in 
employment, and supplementary protection (above minimum statutory requi-
rements) for workers who will be adversely affected. 
Under the Employment Security Act of 1974, an employer must warn the 
union of the intended employment reductions at least one month before a 
planned layoff for lack of work, whether the layoff is temporary or 
permanent, and must offer to start negotiations promtly with the union. If 
the parties disagree about whether the proposed layoff is justified, it cannot 
be put into effect until the dispute has been resolved by the Labor Court, 
which is empowered to modify or delay the layoff. 
Advance notice of layoffs, ranging from two to six months, depending 
upon the number of workers involved, must also be given by the employer to 
the County Labor Market Board, as well as to the union and to individual 
employees slated for discharge. The order in which individuals must be 
retained in temporary or permanent reductions in force is determined by 
law, with workplace seniority being the dominant factor. Special arratrgements 
are made for alternative employment for older workers and the handicapped. 
As part of the scheme of early warning of impending dislocations, the 
government provides 75 percent of a worker's wages for repair or other 
non-production work at firms in témporary difficulty. This subsidy is in-
64 JOINT REPORT, supra note 63, at 10. 
es ibid. 
6» Act No. 580, June 10, 1976, International Labor Office (ILO) Legislative Se-
ries 1976-Swe. 1. 
_. 67 JOINT REPORT, supra note 63, at 11-12. 
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creased to 90 percent for workers 50 years old and over, and to workers in 
the socalled exposed industries, that is, those especially hard hit by import 
competition. 
All of these measures are but a part of the larger system of intensive job 
retraining, promotion of labor mobility, and job creation, developed and 
administered by the AMS. Such a system is possible because of Sweden's 
homogeneous and relatively small population (about 8,000,000), its high level 
of unionization (70 percent overall), the strong national consensus on govern-
ment social and economic policies, and the Swedish genius for working out 
even the most intractable problems through tripartite discussions. 
B. EEC: collective redundancies; mergers, and takeovers 
Discussion of laws relating to collective dismissals for economic reasons 
in other West European countries will be most comprehensible within the 
framework of EEC Directives. In 1975 the Council of the European Commun-
ities issued its directive on collective redundancies.68 It requires employers 
contemplating collective redundancies to begin consultations with the workers' 
representatives with a view to reaching an agreement. These consultations 
must at least cover ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or 
reducing their number and mitigating their consequences. Employers must, 
therefore, supply workers' representatives with all relevant information, and 
must state in writing the reasons for the redundancies, the number of workers 
involved, the number normally employed, and the period over which the 
dismissals are to be effected; this information is intended to enable workers' 
representatives to make constructive counterproposals. Employers must also 
forward to the competent public authorities copies of all written communica-
tions between themselves and workers' representatives. 
Independently of the foregoing procedures for consultation with workers 
representatives, employers must notify competent public authorities in writing 
of any projected collective redundancies. This notification must contain all 
relevant information concerning the plan for collective redundancies and the 
information given to workers' representatives. Copies must also be sent to 
workers' representatives, who may send any comments they may have to the 
public authorities. 
Subject to the authority of Member States to reduce or extend the period, 
at least 30 days must elapse between notification to the public authorities and 
the commencement of collective redundancies. 
In 1977 the Council issued another Directive on the safeguarding of 
employees' rights and. advantages in the case of mergers and takeovers.69 It 
applies to transfers of a business or part of a business within the territorial 
scope of the Treaty establishing the EEC. The tranferor's rights and obliga-
tions arising from a contract of employment or employment relationship 
existing on the date of the transfer must be assumed by the transferee; but 
Member States may require that the transferor shall also continue to be 
liable for rights arising from the employment contract or relationship. Fol-
68 75/129/EEC, Feb. 17, 1975; see EUR. IND. REL. REV. No. 13. 24-25 (Jan 1975) 69 77/187/EEC, Feb. 14, 1977; see EUR. IND. REL. REV. No. 36,25-26 (Dec. 1976). 
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lowing the transfer, the tranferee must maintain the working conditions pro-
vided in a collective agreement, at least until the expiration or termination of 
that agreement or the execution of another. Member States are permitted, 
however, to limit the period for which the transferee must retain those 
working conditions to one year. Member States are also directed to adopt 
measures necessary to protect the interests of the transferor's employees and 
former employees at the time of the transfer in respect of immediate or 
prospective entitlements to old-age and survivors' benefits over and beyond 
the statutory social security schemes. 
Both the transferor and the transferee are required to inform the repre-
sentations of their respective employees of the reasons for the transfer; the 
legal, economic, and social implications of the transfer for the employees; and 
the measures envisaged in relation to the employees. The transferor must 
provide this information to the representatives of its employees "in good 
time," and in any event before the transfer directly affects the conditions of 
work and employment of his employees. If either the transferor or the trans-
feree envisages taking measures in relation to its respective employees as a 
result of the transfer, it must consult with his respective employees' represen-
tatives "in good time," with a view to seeking an agreement. 
Before continuing with an account of the latest proposed Council Direc-
tive, it will be useful to note briefly the laws relating to worker displacements 
in three of the Member States—West Germany, The Netherlands, and France— 
because they have had some influence on that Directive. 
C. West Germany 
West Germany has a similar but not quite so comprehensive a system as 
Sweden's for dealing with potential and actual employment dislocations 
caused by closures, removals, or reductions in force. It has no. control agency 
comparable to the AMS, nor are there tripartite bodies to administer policies 
of the Ministries of Labor and Economics. At the enterprise level, however, 
pursuant to the provisions of the Works Constitution Act of 19 72,70 the works 
councils, consisting of representatives elected by all the workers — union and 
non-union, blue-collar and white-collar — have substantially the same rights 
is respect of advance notice and full disclosure by the epiployer concerning 
proposed employee displacements, negotiations over all details of the propo-
sed dislocation, and adjudication by a labor court of any unresolved details, 
as those enjoyed by Swedish unions. Agreements' reached as a result of these 
negotiations are known as "social plans." They deal comprehensively with 
ways of avoiding or easing the economic hardships on workers as a conse-
quence of employment cutbacks, by minimizing the number of outright dis-
missals and providing broad economic protection for those who are dismissed.71 
The Protection Against Dismissal Act of 196972 bars the "socially unjusti-
fied" dismissal of any worker after a probationary period of six months. In 
the case of mass dismissals the enterprise must notify the Labor Ministry in 
advance. Reasons for the planned dismissals must be stated, and. the-employer 
70 ILO Legislative Series 1972-Ger. F. R. 1. - ; . . 
JOINT REPORT, supra note 63, at 22. 
72 ILO Legislative Series 1969-Ger. F. R. - • 
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must also forward a copy of the works council's opinion as to whether the 
layoffs are justified. The regional office of the Labor Ministry is empowered 
to delay any dismissals for up to two months after it receives notification 
from the employer. In practice, the authorities usually delay dismissals for 
one month, in order to provide time to arrange retraining and other programs 
for affected workers.73 
D. The Netherlands 
The Dutch Works Councils Act of 197974 establishes a system with strong 
similarities to those of Sweden and West Germany, but one that goes even 
further in some respects.75 The law expands the scope of the previous code-
termination requirements and states that the employer must "obtain the 
council's consent" for proposed changes and modifications relating to a broad 
range of terms and conditions of employment. Should the works council and 
the employer,-in the context of a joint meeting, not be able to resolve their 
differences over a co-determination issue, it must be referred for final reso-
lution to an external, "trade comission," consisting of representatives from 
both sides. 
Works Councils must now be consulted prior to a decision being taken by 
management regarding, among other things, establishment of new under-
takings, withdrawing or entering into financial coo-peration with other firms, 
and hiring temporary workers. Prior consultations regarding closures and 
transfers were already required. Before any final decision is taken on any of 
these matters by management, there must be a discussion with the council, and 
the employer must give detailed reasons for its plans. The council must also 
be asked for its opinion "in time for it to be able to influence the final 
decision." Multinational corporations are excused from the prior consultation 
requirement only if the plan in question "could not reasonably be expected 
to have any direct impact on undertakings in the Netherlands." The exception 
does not apply, however, if a decision to transfer production away from The 
Netherlands is involved, or if any "substantial investment" is being made. 
Whenever a works council opinion on a consultation issue runs counter 
to the employer's view, the employer is precluded from implementing the 
decision for at least one month. During this period, the council can appeal 
against the employer's plan to the Commercial Section of the Amsterdam 
Court of Justice. The court has the power to revoke the decision after having 
determined "whether the employer could reasonably have arrived at the 
decision in question after weighing all the interests involved." 
Dutch works councils are also entitled to receive from employers semi-
annual reports on the "general activities" of the undertaking; annual "financial 
accounts" of the undertaking, placing these in context of any larger group of 
which it is a part; and information on "future prospects" and activities, plus 
any long-term budget forecasts. 
73 JOINT REPORT, supra note 63, at 24. 
74 See EUR. IND. REL. REV., No. 54, 10-12 (June 1978). 
75 This discussion of the Dutch Works Councils Act is based on Netherlands 
Works Councils Come of Age, EUR. IND. REL. REV., No. 82, 7-8 (Nov. 1980). 
76 Act No. 75-5 respecting dismissals for economic reasons, Jan. 3, 1975, ILO 
Legislative Series 1975-Fr. 1. 
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E. France 
In 1977 France adopted a new Decree implementing a 1975 Act76 on 
procedures to be followed in redundancy stituations.77 The Decree requires 
all private and public undertakings with at least 50 workers to inform the 
local labor inspector of "any movements in their level of manpower" within 
the first eight, days of each month. Subject to certain limited exceptions in 
the public sector, all employers, regardless of workforce size, must gain prior 
approval' from the Labor Inspectorate for any recruitment or dismissal that 
comes within 12 months following redundancies. 
F. EEC: Multinationals 
We may now return to the latest and most controversial EEC draft Di-
rective, establishing new rules on information for and consultation with 
employee representatives of multinationals.78 If adopted, the Directive will 
apply to all multinationals in the EEC (regardless of head office location) and 
national firms with 100 or more workers operating in a single Common 
Market country. This document is known as thé "Vredeling Directive," because 
its principal; draftsman was Henk Vredeling of The Netherlands, a former 
EEC Social Affairs Commissioner. 
Under the daft Directive, as amended,70 the obligations to inform and 
consult are approximately the same for both multinational and national firms 
covered by the Directive. Each firm is required to draw up an information 
statement at least every six months, summarizing the activities "of the domi-
nant undertaking and its subsidiaries taken as a whole." The statement must 
cover structure and manning; thp economic and financial situation; the gene-
ral situation and probable trends in business, production, and sales; the 
employment situation and likely trends; production and investment programs; 
rationalization projects; manufacturing and working methods, particularly the 
introduction of new working methods incorporating new technology; and all 
procedures and plans that "are liable to have a substantial' effect on the 
employees' interests." Copies of these statements must be sent to employees' 
representatives. 
The draft Directive gives employees' representatives prior consultation 
rights over certain planned decisions covering all .or a main part of a firm or 
its subsidiaries when these could "substatially" affect employee interests. 
Detailed information on these issues must be sent by EEC central management 
to management in each subsidiary with 1,000®° or more employees at some 
point prior to the final adoption of a decision.81 Such information must in-
clude an explanation of the reasons of the proposed decision, its legal, 
77 Decree óf Dec. 28, 1977; see EUR, IND. REL. REV. No. 50, 5-6 (Feb. 1978). 
.7? EUR. IND.• REL. REV., No. 82, 22-24 (Nov.. 1980). 
78 Some 37, amendents, largely supported by business, were adopted by the 
European Parliament before the proposal was approved on Dec. 14, 1982. See BNÁ 
Daily Lab. Rep. No. 251: A-9 (Dec. 30, 1982). . . j . 
so The number of employees was only 100 or more in the original draft. 
. si The original draft required notification at , least 40 days prior to the taking 
of a decision. . 
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economic, and social consequences for the workers concerned, and measure? 
planned in respect of those workers. 
The draft Directive lists the following types of decisions covered by the 
required prior consultation procedure: closure or transfer of part of or an 
entire establishment; major cutbacks, expansion plans, or changes in company 
activities; major organizational changes; and any partnerships with other 
firms or the termination of existing business relationships .of that kind. 
Management has the right, however, to decline to supply data that it regards 
as "secret"; it also is not required to provide employee representatives with 
any data not disclosed to shareholders. 
Upon receipt of this information, a subsidiary is obligated to disclose it 
to the employees' representatives without delay. An amendment réquires that 
employee representatives authorized to receive management information under 
the directive be elected by secret ballot, despite the absence of such a provi-
sion from the national laws and practices of a number of the 10 EEC coun-
tries. They then have 30 days in which to give an opinion. If they conclude 
that the planned decision will have. direct adverse consequences on employ-
ment or working conditions, subsidiary management may then be required 
to consult with the employees' representatives with a view to seeking agree-
ment on ways of alleviating likely hardship. Employee representatives are also 
entitled to submit written requests for further information to the parent 
company, but only when company at the national or local level refuses to 
provide the requested data.82 
The draft Directive leaves it to the legislatures of Member States to de-
termine those employee representatives to be given information and consul-
tation rights. It does provide, however, that so far as consultation is 
concerned, if there exists in a Member State "a body representing employees 
at a level higher than that of the individual subsidiary" (such as a group or 
central works council), this body will have the right to participate in consul-
tations. 
The draft Directive provides for no penalties for breach of its provisions; 
it leaves that determination to the individual Member States. It dee-declare 
however, that national implementing legislation must provide a right of 
appeal for employees' representatives with regard to disputed company 
decisions affecting their members. 
It was inevitable that the draft Directive would not be adopted by the 
EEC Council of Ministers in its original form. The Community-level employers 
association (Union Internationale des Industries de la Communauté Europé-
enne) is totally opposed to it, and the Community's main union organization 
(European Trade Union Confederation) is also opposed because the draft 
82 As originally drafted, the Directive included a so-called bypass provision that 
would have entitled unions to call for consultations with a company's international 
headquarters if they were not satisfied with the responses from the national or 
local levels. According to Paul Weinberg, a vice-president of American Express 
Co!, "[In this bypass provision] the unions are after more than disclosure. In par-
ticular, they would like to see the accounts of multinational corporations; i. e., 
headquarters. They are not interested in the country ledgers. If, for example, a 
company operates out of London, they want to see the London accounts and how 
they will affect them in France or in the underdeveloped countries." BNA Daily 
Lab. Rep., supra note 79, at A-10. 
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omits specific penalties.83 Even as amended, however, the Directive will almost 
certainly go far beyond what employers in the United States, who have 
reacted with alarm to the Vredeling proposals, would be ready to accept.84 
V. PROPOSED FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION 
A. Summary of Legislative Proposals 
Despite the fundamental antipathy of American employers to mandatory 
legislative requirements of disclosure and consultation with employees or 
unions prior to closing or relocating plants, or consolidating or reducing 
employment levels, a growing number of bills introduced in the federal and 
state legislatures has reflected the impact of European experience.85 At the 
federal level, the first relatively recent effort to secure comprehensive plant 
closing lgislation began in 1974, with the introduction in the House of the 
National Employment Priorities Act.8fi The bill was aimed at "arbitrary and 
unnecessary closing and transfers . . . which cause irreparable social and eco-
nomic harm to employees, local communities and the nation . . ." It would 
have established a National Employment Relocation Administration, with the 
authority, triggered by a request from an affected union, or 10 percent of 
the employees, to investigate and report on each closing and to determine 
whether or not the closing was "justifiable." An unjustified closing would 
result in the loss to the employer of eligibility for various tax benefits. A 
comprehensive program of federal financial assistance to the worker, the 
threatened business, local businesses, and the local government was also 
contemplated. Companion legislation to the House proposal was introduced 
in the Senate the following year. 
A variety of other bills followed, spurred by the growing number of plant 
closings. They embodied increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive propo-
sals, supported by a broad spectrum of groups, ranging from industrial 
communities hard hit by the economic recession to a committee of Auto 
Workers, Machinists, and Steelworkers, following a study tour of Sweden, 
West Germany, and Great Britain.87 None of these proposals has been enacted 
into law. Taken as a whole, the • legislative proposals fall into six categories: 
prenotification, governmental regulatory intervention, employer benefits 
assistance, local and federal government compensation by employers, em-
ployer assistance, and employee boyout assistance.88 
83 EUR. IND. REL. REV., No. 82, 5 (Nov. 1980). 
84 For example, David A. Ruth, Director of International Affairs of the U. S. 
Council for International Business, warned that even the amended Directive "would 
still internationalize industrial relations and allow, among other things, for the 
creation of an EEC-wide works council of employees to receive information and 
engage in consultations with management." And according to Paul Weinberg, " 'Con-
sultation' is another dangerous word, because from the union's perspective 'consul-
tation' means 'negotiation.' " BNA Daily Lab. Rep., supra note 79, ait A-10. 
ss For a review and analysis of the types of bills introduced see, especially, 
Millspaugh, supra note 2. Briefer discussions may be found in B. BLUESTONE & 
B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITY: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUEN-
CES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 256-60 (1980), and A. Freedman, Analysis of 
Plant Closing Legislation, BNA Daily Lab. Rep. No. 152: E-l (Aug. 5, 1980). 
86 H. R. 13541, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). 
87 See JOINT REPORT, supra note 63. 
88 Millspaugh, supra note 2, at 299. 
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At the state level there has been a similar increase in the number of 
proposals to deal with the problem of plant closings and renewals, and a 
similar lack of success in getting them adopted. These proposals can be 
grouped generally into three categories: prenotification, severance benefits, 
and creation of a community assistance fund.89 
B. Employer Attitudes Toward Legislative Proposals 
It is not my purpose to discuss in this article the merits and weaknesses 
of the numerous bills relating to plant closings and relocations that have been 
proposed to federal and state legislatures. It is important, however, to note 
the almost uniformly hostile stance taken against all such proposals by the 
American business community, because that is surely a significant dimension 
of the problem confronting the country.90 
The following quoted statements are illustrative of many others that 
might be cited: .;.. . 
Even serious consideration of this bill [on plant closings] would be raising 
a sign on the borders pf this state investment isn't welcome here. A firm 
with divisions in other states would have one more incentive to expand 
elsewhere.91 
Unions are interested in raising wages and fringe benefits for their 
members. They know, however, that their ability to do this is restricted 
by the threat of firms moving to new locations. If business can be pre-
vented from moving, the immediate threat of. job loss is taken away, and, 
as a consequence, unions can be expected to increase their demands on 
employers.92 
The purpose of those bills is to give politicians and unions property 
rights in the existing distribution of jobs and business activity. And the 
exercise of these rights would prevent businesses from moving to more 
profitable and productive locations. Instead, the firm's assets are kept in 
place where they can be pillaged by the feather-bedding and antiquated 
work rules of union shops and forced to pay the bills run up by vote-
buying politicians . . .93 
What can reasonably be inferred from these comments is that American 
industry opposes legislation that would place any limitation on the freedom 
of the individual employer to shut down or move its plant for economic 
reasons, or to grant or whithold advance notice of its decision, as it sees fit. 
Many businesses have acted in good faith to ease the impact of such decisions 
on their employees, once the decisions have been taken, but it is questionable 
how useful those efforts really are. As previously noted, the assistance offered 
consists largely of severance pay, relocation pay, aid in finding a new job, 
89 id. at 297. 
90 See BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 85, at 260-66, from which the 
examples used here were taken. 
91 Statement by a spokesman for Assoctiated Industries of Massachusetts, quoted 
by Liz Bass, "Runaway Plants Leave Workers Out in the Cold," The Citizen Ad-
vocat6 March 1979 p 3 
92 R. MCKENZIE. RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS MOBILITY 57 (1979), a book 
published by the American Enterprise Ass'n. 
93 "Words and Deeds," The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 23, 1979, p. 20. 
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and minimal job retraining; rarely does it comprise all of these elements. 
Even then, it is inadequate to deal with the tragic byproducts of job losses 
and plant renewals: income loss and underemployment, loss of family wealth, 
deterioration of physical and mental health, as well as the creation of 
"ghost towns," "community anomie," and related private and public ills.94 
The problems created by plant shutdowns and removals cannot be solved, 
or even effectively ameliorated, by the discretionary unilateral actions of 
employers. Nor is it enough to require employers to bargain with unions over 
the consequences of a plant closure or removal. In the first place, as pre-
viously noted, such a requirement applies to only about a quarter of the labor 
force. Also, at the time bargaining takes place, the union is usually in a 
position of great weakness relative to the employer, who has. figuratively, 
packed his bags and is now half-way out the door. Finally, in the usual case, 
the union is able to obtain for the employees it represents not much more 
than a band-aid to cover a gaping wound, and the community that is being 
abandoned gets nothing. Obviously, the NLRA is a useless instrument with 
which to deal with this problem. The success of efforts to improve the 
existing situation is dependent, therefore, on a change in the attitude of 
business generally toward some government regulation of both thé procedures 
to be followed in respect of plant closings or removals and the minimum 
employee protective provisions to be provided. 
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Faced with the immediate consequences of various kinds of natural dis-
asters—floods, fires, earthquakes, tornadoes, and the like—private citizens in 
this country, as well as the federal and state governments, are capable of 
prodigies of organization and cooperation to provide relief for the victims. 
Unhappily, no comparable efforts on a similar scale are forthcoming to 
relieve individuals and communities whose lives are seriously disrupted, even 
destroyed by sudden plant closings or removals. Although in most instances 
such events can be predicted well in advance, the idea of advance planning 
to forestall them or to ameliorate their effects, which involves not only 
employers and their employees, but also unions, if any, and the government, 
remains an unpopular one. 
Why should this be so? Clearly, the business ethos in our society is 
extremely hostile to "governmental intervention" in the private economy, 
even when it takes the form of bailouts of failing corporate giants, such as 
Lockheed and Chrysler. By the same token, opposition to any government 
control of the mobility of capital is automatic and powerful. As previously 
noted, some moderation of these attitudes is essential if there is to be any 
significant change in present conditions, and it would be naive to suppose 
that the legislative responses of the European countries that I have touched 
upon so briefly and superficially will offer any encouragement in that direc-
tion. To the contrary, the European "model" is more likely to frighten Amer-
ican employers and to harden their resistance to any governmental legis-
lation affecting plant closing or removals. That is a natural reaction; after 
94 These consequences have been documented in painful detail in BLUESTONE 
& HARRISON, supra note 85, at 62-83. 
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all, the European legislation is the product of economic, social, and political 
environments profoundly different in many respects from our own. What 
works for those countries, if it does work, need not, and probably would 
not, work for us. Nevertheless, the advantages of carefully studying what 
those and other countries—e.g., Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan—do in re-
spect of dislocations caused by plant closures and removals are considerable. 
What we can learn is to view our own problems from a new and different 
perspective, to ask ourselves what might happen if we were to abandon our 
basic premise that any social measures that impede the mobility of capital are 
necessarily bad and must therefore be rejected. 
Actually, there is nothing new about such a perspective. The idea of some 
form of federal or state regulation of plant closings and removals, as we have 
seen, has been embodied in proposed legislation for over a decade. Indeed, 
it was discussed in the 1966 Report of the National Comission on Technology. 
Automation, and Economic Progress.65 What the Commission had to say in its 
report has lost none of its relevance in the intervening years. Despite the 
tendency of some groups to regard the problems incident to plant closings 
and removals as regrettable but temporary phenomena, associated with the 
economic recession from which we seem at last to be slowly emerging, the 
truth is that these problems are occasioned in large part by a rapidly 
changing technology and will be with us indefinitely. The Commission inter-
preted its assignment as including an obligation to make recommendations to 
management and labor and to all levels of government to facilitate occupa-
tional adjustment and geographical mobility" and to "share the costs and 
help prevent and alleviate the adverse impact of change on displaced 
workers."90 
The Commission's recommendations ranged from relatively cautious and 
moderate prescriptions to what were then bold and innovative proposals. 
Among the latter were "a program of public service employment, providihg. 
in effect, that the goversment be an employer of last resort, providing work 
for 'hard-core unemployed' in useful community enterprises"; and that "eco-
nomic security be guaranteed by a floor under family income." including 
"both improvements in wage related benefits and a broader system of income 
maintenance for those families unable to provide for themselves."97 It con-
sidered that the "responsibility of Government is to foster an environment 
of opportunity in which satisfactory adjustment to change can occur," but 
that "the adjustments themselves must occur primarily in the private employ-
ment relationship."98 Its suggestions for government involvement were con-
fined largely to establish "a national computerized job-man matching system 
which would provide more adequate information on employment opportunities 
and available workers on a local, regional, and national scale";99 to federalize 
the public employment service; to create a permanent program of relocation 
assistance to workers and their families stranded in economically declining 
»5 i TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (I960), hereafter cited 
as "COMM"N REP." The Comission was established by Act of Aug 5, 1964, PUB. 
L. No. 88-444. 
ee 1 COMM'N REP., supra note 95, at 33. 
97 Id. at 110. 
98 id. at 111. 
9» Ibid. 
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areas; and to adopt the following recommendation relating to economic 
planning and development: 
We recommend that each Federal Reserve bank provide the leadership 
for economic development activities in its own region. The development 
program in each Federal Reserve District should include: (1) A regular 
program of economic analysis; (2) an advisory council for economic growth 
composed of representatives from each of the major interested groups 
within the district; (3) a capital bank to provide venture capital and 
long-term financing for new and growing companies; (4) regional technical 
institutes to serve as centers for disseminating scientific and technical 
knowledge relevant to the region's development; and (5) a Federal 
executive in each district to provide regional coordination of the various 
Federal programs related to economic development.100 
In the Commission's view, an adequate adjustment program to deal with 
technological change, to be achieved through a combination of both 
government and private policies, must satisfy the following basic requirements: 
(1) those displaced should be offered either a substantially equivalent or 
better alternative job or the training or education required to obtain such a 
job; (2) they should be guaranteed adequate financial security while search-
ing for alternative jobs, or while undertaking training; (3) they should be 
given sufficient financial assistance to permit them to relocate their families 
whenever this becomes necessary; and (4) they should be protected against 
forfeiture of earned security rights, such as vacation, retirement, insurance, 
and related credits, resulting from job displacements.101 
The Commission's more specific suggestion of ways for private parties to 
facilitate adjustments to change are by now familiar. It largely discounted 
the common fears of employers of formal advance-notice agreements, noting 
that "the United States is the only industrialized country that permits the 
closings of large plants without notice."102 It urged the adoption of "early 
warning systems" that would alert employees to the possibility or inevitability 
of future compulsory job changes; it also recommended "the broad 
dissemination of information about general technological developments 
throughout an industry or region [which] would alert employers, unions and 
employees alike to the possibility and timing of changes."103 
Among the most important of the Commission's findings and recommen-
dations were those relating to education.104 It emphasized that education must 
be understood as a process of life-long learning, and that young people should 
be prepared from an early age to accommodate to changing job requirements 
in their mature years. Versatility and flexibility, the Commission found, are 
the indispensable elements to be developed by our educational system. While 
recognizing that "training for many—perhaps most—specific jobs can and 
must be done on the job as a responsibility of the employer," the Commission 
suggested that "there are some pupils whose greatest potential can be realized 
through occupational-vocational-technical education," which, coupled with a 
parallel program of general education, "can equip them with both job skills 
and a solid foundation for the adaptability necessary in a dynamic society.'"05 
n>° Ibid. 
191 Id. at 60. 
i02 Id. at 67. 
"3 id. at 43-49. 
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The quality of education at all levels in the United States has 
been steadily declining in recent years, the* most recent judgment by a 
qualified group of evaluators has pronounced it "mediocre." This problem is 
by. no means unrelated to that of plant closings and removals, some of which 
might not be necessary if the local labor force were capable of adapting to 
the production of an entirely different product. Although primary responsi-
bility for the upgrading of our educational system must be assumed by the 
state and federal governments, even those businesses opposed to governmental 
regulation of the timing and procedures of plant closings and removals would 
be acting in their own interests by contributing to the improvement of 
educational facilities at all levels. 
I have dwelt in this closing section on the findings and recommendations 
of the Commission, not because I believe they provide a panacea for our 
present ills, but because the same ideas have been repeated quite recently,106 
and because I believe that they offer useful suggestions as to how we may 
start to combat them within a framework that American industry ought not 
to perceive as unduly threatening. Many would regard the Commission's 
recommendations as inadequate to deal with the problems we now face; but 
if government is to intervene in a substantial way to control and alleviate 
the worst consequences of unrestricted plant closings and removals—as I be-
lieve it must—the process must be accomplished gradually, or it will fail 
entirely. 
Meanwhile, we may be sure that the problems discussed in this article 
will not go away; they will continue to tear rents in our social fabric unless 
and until we, as a society, accept the responsibility of planning, to prevent, or 
to ameliorate in an effective way, the human tragedies and economic waste 
inherent in unregulated plant closings and removals., 
1°« A NATION AT RISK, REP. OF NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN 
EDUCATION (1983), quoted in Los Angeles Times, 27 April, 1983, p. 1. 
106 See, e.g., Remarks of Presid°nt Reagan before National Conference on Dis-
located Workers, Pittsburgh, Pa., BNA Daily Lab. Rep. No. 67: X - l (April 6, 1983); 
"Transition of Displaced Workers to New Jobs Said Eased by Labor, Management 
Cooperation," Id. No. 69: CC-1 (April 8, 1983). 
